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This paper will analyze the emerging law and economics justification for
alimony. It will argue that while the economic justification for alimony
contains some important insights, feminists and other family law scholars
should ultimately be wary of attempting to justify postdivorce incomesharing by relying primarily on economic efficiency grounds.
Part I of the paper will briefly sketch the historical and doctrinal
developments that have led a number of economists and family law scholars to suggest economic rationales for divorce-related income transfers.
Part II will outline the economic efficiency argument in support of alimony. That argument draws heavily on the early work of economists Gary
Becker and Elisabeth Landes and has been advanced most recently by
Allen Parkman in his 1992 book on no-fault divorce. 1 Economic efficiency
arguments also form the core of Ira Ellman's influential theory of alimony,2 and these same arguments animate the spousal support provisions
of the American Law Institute's Principlesof the Law of Family Dissolution
draft.3
Part III of the paper will highlight the insights offered by the economic
approach to alimony and, more generally, by the application of economic
analysis to legal issues relating to marriage and divorce. Part IV will
critique the economic approach from a feminist perspective. 4 It will argue
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February 11-12, 1994 Georgetown Law Journal Symposium entitled "Divorce and Feminist
Legal Theory" and the Georgetown University Law Center Faculty Research Workshop for
their thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this article. Extended and enjoyable
conversations with Peg Brinig, June Carbone, and Mitt Regan were particularly valuable in
helping me to develop and refine the ideas presented here. Any errors that remain are, of
course, my own.
1. ALLEN H. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? (1992).
2. See Ira M. Ellman, The Theory ofAlimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 3, 40 (1989).
3. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-

(American Law Inst. Preliminary Draft No.4 1993). Revealingly, the chapter containing the principles governing postdivorce spousal support is entitled "Compensatory Spousal
Payments."
4. By feminist perspective, I refer to a perspective that takes women and their experiences
seriously and that views gender-that is, the social meaning ascribed to one's biological
sex-as an important category of analysis. As June Carbone has noted, "[fleminism generally
is defined not in terms of a particular position or set of positions, but by an insistence that
women's experiences, varied as they are, be taken into account." June R. Carbone, A
Feminist Perspective on Divorce, in 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 183, 183 (Richard E.
Behrman et al. eds., 1994). I do not mean, by this explanation, to minimize the diversity of
viewpoints and experiences among women, nor to suggest that there can be only a single
TIONS
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that the economic efficiency justification for alimony rests on assumptions
that are extremely troubling from the perspective of feminist theory, and
that adoption of the economic approach is unlikely to remedy the disparate economic effects of divorce on women and the children for whom they
continue to care. Finally, Part V will suggest some directions for an
alternative approach to divorce-related financial allocations.
I. How WE GOT HERE
Under the fault-based divorce system, alimony was coherent in theory,
5
even if awarded only rarely in practice. Because divorce was available only
where one spouse had breached his marital obligations, alimony functioned as a sort of damages remedy for breach of the state-imposed
marriage contract. 6 Moreover, because that contract was explicitly genderbased and imposed support obligations on husbands alone, only wives were
entitled to alimony in the event of a divorce. Alternatively, under the
fault-based system, a divorce proceeding could be conceived as a particular
type of tort action, and alimony could be justified as compensatory dam7
ages for the "guilty" spouse's wrongful conduct.
The advent of no-fault divorce and the demise of the state-imposed
marriage contract significantly undermined these traditional rationales for
alimony. Because divorce no longer required a showing of fault or breach,
a damage remedy seemed inappropriate. Similarly, because marital obligations were no longer officially gender-based, an alimony remedy premised
on the husband's support obligation and available only to the wife seemed
8
both anachronistic and discriminatory. Moreover, while the fault-based
"feminist perspective" on issues relating to marriage and divorce, or on any other legal
question. Indeed, an acknowledgment of the partiality of knowledge and a corresponding
skepticism of theories that claim to derive from or to generate universal truths is one of the
defining percepts of much contemporary feminist thought. See generally Katherine Bartlett,

Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 867-87 (1990) (discussing feminist epistomologies); Clare Dalton, Where We Stand, Observations on the Situation of Feminist Legal Thought,

3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 1, 42-47 (1987-88). For a perceptive exploration of the meaning
of feminism as an academic discipline in light of these methodological precepts, see Carol
230-37
Sanger, Feminism and Disciplinarity: The Curl of the Petals, 27 Loy. L. REV. 225,

(1993).
5. Studies indicate that fewer than 16% of divorcing wives received alimony under the

fault-based divorce system between 1887 and 1922. E.g., Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and
Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (1989) (citing LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE
DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNINTENDED
WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985)).

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

FOR

6. See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL

STUD. 869, 875-76 (1994). For a discussion of the terms of the state-imposed marriage

contract, see Jana Singer, The Privatizationof Family Law, 1992 WiS. L. REV. 1443, 1456-57.
7. See Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of A Theory, 23
NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 454-56 (1988) (discussing the parallels between divorce law and tort

law).
8. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979) (finding unconstitutional Alabama statutes that
required husbands, but not wives, to pay alimony).
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divorce system emphasized the importance of preserving the marital unit,
the no-fault system focused on effectuating the desire of one or both
spouses to end their marriage. 9 Without a societally imposed duty to
continue the marriage, justifying financial obligations that survived divorce
became problematic.
Divorce reform thus left alimony in somewhat of a theoretical vacuum."
Reformers initially sought to fill this vacuum by reconceptualizing alimony
as a short-term transition payment designed to enable formerly dependent
spouses to become economically self-sufficient as soon as possible. 1 To
this end, trial courts in a number of jurisdictions largely replaced so-called
permanent alimony with short-term "rehabilitative" awards. 2 This shift
from open-ended to term-limited awards was also consistent with the
reformers' emphasis on effectuating a clean financial break between divorcing spouses.' 3
Beginning in the mid-1970s, a series of empirical studies revealed that
this initial reconceptualization of alimony was producing financially devas-

9. See Margaret F. Brinig & June R. Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and
Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 855, 867 (1988) ("Divorce is a matter of individual choice, following
... from the end of mutual affection."); Singer, supra note 6, at 1470-71 (noting that, with
no-fault divorce, the state has ceded to the spouses themselves the authority to end a
marriage).
10. Ellman, supra note 2, at 6.
11. See, e.g., Henry H. Foster & Doris J. Freed, Spousal Rights in Retirement and Pension
Benefits, 16 J. FAM. L. 187, 191 (1977-1978) (arguing that with the advent of no-fault divorce,
alimony "has come to be regarded as an interim stipend which is available for a relatively
short time while a former spouse in need prepares for the labor market"); Ann L. Estin,
Maintenance,Alimony, and the Rehabilitationof Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 725 (1993)
(alimony reforms direct those who are not currently self-supporting "to 'rehabilitate' themselves quickly and move into the world of full-time paid employment").
12. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brantner, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1977) (reversing trial court
award of term-limited alimony to wife who divorced after 25 year marriage with no education
or job skills and admonishing that no-fault divorce reforms "may not be used as a handy
vehicle for the summary disposition of old and used wives"); Wieder v. Wieder, 402 So. 2d 66
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that trial court abused its discretion in awarding only
short term rehabilitative alimony to 60 year old wife who divorced in poor health after 23
year marriage); see also Foster & Freed, supra note 11, at 191 (noting that with the advent of
no-fault divorce, alimony "has come to be regarded as an interim stipend which is available for a relatively short time while a former spouse in need prepares for the labor
market"). For a discussion and critique of these developments, see Linda B. Marshall,
RehabilitativeAlimony: An Old Wolf in New Clothes, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 667
(1985).
13. See Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 291, 313-14 (1987) (stating that no-fault divorce philosophy favors clean break with
minimal ongoing financial relationships between divorced spouses); Joan M. Krauskopf,
Theories of Property Division ISpousal Support: Searchingfor Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM.
L.Q. 253, 272 (1989) (describing divorce reformers' assumption that clean break advantaged
both homemaker and income producing spouses after divorce); Milton C. Regan, Spouses
and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2314 (1994)
(discussing clean break philosophy).
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14
tating results for many divorced women (and their children). In addition,

a number of feminist and other scholars began seriously to challenge both
the theoretical goal of economic self-sufficiency for all divorcing 15spouses
and the "clean break" philosophy that had accompanied that goal. In the
face of these challenges, scholars, courts, and policymakers began to
search for other conceptual models to justify alimony in the age of nofault.
A number of jurisprudential and societal developments made economic
analysis a particularly attractive candidate to fill the conceptual void. Over
the previous two decades, scholars in a number of disciplines had successfully challenged the ideological and methodological separation between
the family and other societal institutions, particularly politics and the
market.16 At the same time, both legal and popular discourse had increas14. Perhaps the best known of these studies was lCenore Weitzman's examination of the
economic and social consequences of no-fault divorce reform in California. LENORE J.

CONSEWEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
Weitzof
results
the
Although
(1985).
AMERICA
IN
CHILDREN
AND
QUENCES FOR WOMEN

man's studies have been questioned, a number of more recent studies have confirmed her
basic conclusion-that women and children are disproportionately disadvantaged in financial
terms as a consequence of divorce. See, e.g., Rosalyn B. Bell, Alimony and the Financially
Dependent Spouse in Montgomery County, Maryland, 22 FAM. L.Q. 225, 284 (1988); Robert E.
McGraw et al., A Case Study in Divorce Law Reform and Its Aftermath, 20 J. FAM. L. 443
(1981-82); James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce For
Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351 (1987); Barbara R. Rowe & Alice M. Morrow, The
Economic Consequences of Divorce in Oregon After 10 or More Years of Marriage, 24 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 463 (1988); Barbara R. Rowe & Jean M. Lown, The Economics of Divorce and
Remarriage for Rural Utah Families, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 301 (1990); Charles E. Welch III &
Sharon Price-Bonham, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce Revisited: California, Georgia, and
Washington, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 411 (1983); Heather R. Wishik, Economics of Divorce:
An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79 (1986). Although it is questionable whether women
fared better (economically) under the old fault-based system, it is clear that the no-fault
system does not equitably or adequately meet their needs. Cf. Stephen D. Sugarman,
Dividing Financial Interests at Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 130-65

(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) (questioning whether women are
significantly worse off under California's no-fault system than they were under the prior fault
regime, while acknowledging that divorced women fare considerably worse than men under
both regimes). See generally Singer, supra note 5, at 1103 (arguing that the economic
consequences of divorce are far more serious for women than for men).
15. See, e.g., Estin, supra note 11, at 721-22 (criticizing contemporary divorce laws that
over-emphasize self-sufficiency norms and undercompensate the caregiver's contribution to
marriage); Joan M. Krauskopf, RehabilitativeAlimony: Uses and Abuses of Limited Duration
Alimony, 1988 A.B.A. SEC. FAM. L. 65 (noting judicial trend away from imposing strict time
limits on alimony awards and arguing for indefinite alimony to compensate divorced spouse
who devoted more time to homemaking during marriage); Jane Rutherford, Duty In Divorce:
Shared Income As A Path To Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 539, 568-69 (1990) (arguing
that "rehabilitative alimony" awarded in lump sum or short period does not account for
lower earnings of spouse who has not been employed for period of years or who wishes to
continue to devote time to caretaking role after divorce).
16. See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY ix-x (1981) (asserting that economic

approach provides a framework applicable to all human behavior, including behavior in and
around families); Singer, supra note 6, at 1522-23 (citing social science, sociological, and
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ingly come to view family relationships as closely analogous to-rather
than fundamentally different from-relationships in other spheres of life,
including market interactions. 1 7 As a result, explanations and models of
human behavior that had gained credence in the market realm began to be
seen as equally applicable to relations in and around the family.18
The Supreme Court's evolving privacy jurisprudence during the 1970s
and early 1980s also enhanced the appeal of economic analysis, as the
Court increasingly anointed the individual, rather than the family or the
marital unit, as the exclusive repository of constitutional rights.1 9 In particular, the Court's emphasis on decisional autonomy within the family both
presaged and reinforced the economists' focus on rational choice and on
the individual as the appropriate unit of legal analysis.
In addition to these scholarly and juridical developments, increased
societal disagreement about what constituted appropriate "family values"
and about the proper link (if any) between moral discourse and family law
fueled the search for purportedly neutral justifications for legal obligations
within the family, particularly those obligations that had traditionally
survived divorce.2 ° Economic analysis purports to provide just such a
morally neutral justification.2 1
Finally, economic analysis-at least on the surface-seems to cohere
with notions of formal gender equality and the rejection of rigid gender
roles. Economic analysis, in general, assumes a high degree of both individual autonomy and fungibility among subjects.2 2 Similarly, formal equal-

economic theories that paved the way for application of economic analysis to "noneconomic
activities" such as family behavior).
17. Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition:From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82

GEO. L.J. 1519, 1534-37 (1994). For an extensive analysis and critique of the rise of "market
discourse" in connection with family law issues, see Milton C. Regan, Jr., Market Discourse
and Moral Neutrality in Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 605 (1994).
18. See Dolgin, supra note 17, at 1520, 1534-35; 1559-64 (describing process by which

society's understanding of people within families has increasingly merged with its understanding of people in the marketplace); Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of
Looking at Behavior, 101 J. POL. ECON. 385, 395-402 (1993) (describing "rational choice

analysis" of family behavior).
19. See Dolgin, supra note 17, at 1535-47 (discussing cases).
20. Regan, supra note 13, at 2306-10; Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and The Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1812-13 (1985).

21. See, e.g., PARKMAN, supra note 1, at 3 ("Economic analysis, based on society's preference for efficient outcomes, provides an alternate explanation to the moralistic one given for
the introduction of no-fault divorce."). Whether economic analysis, even in its descriptive
form, is in fact morally neutral is contested. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 13, at 2313-38.
22. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10 (1983)
(stating economic assumption of consumer sovereignty which holds that individual consumers generally know what is best for themselves); Julie A. Nelson, The Study of Choice or the
Study of Provisioning, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS 23, 25
(Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 1993) ("The phrase 'the economic approach to'
is commonly used to mean viewing a problem in terms of choices, especially the individual
welfare or profit maximizing choices of autonomous rational agents.").
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ity models minimize the importance of gender differences and emphasize
the claims of both women and men to be treated as autonomous, rightsbearing individuals. 23 The economic rationale for alimony-unlike more
traditional rationales-also seemed consistent with a gender-neutral partnership model of marriage, which rejected the state-imposed marriage
contract and viewed spouses as independent and autonomous individuals,
each contributing voluntarily to a joint enterprise.2 4
II. THE ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR ALIMONY
Unlike traditional theories of alimony, which focus on achieving distributive justice between divorcing spouses, the economic rationale views alimony primarily as a means of encouraging efficient behavior during
marriage.2 ' This efficiency rationale incorporates two attributes characteristic of a normative economic approach to law. First, it adopts an ex
ante-rather than an ex post-perspective for purposes of evaluating the
consequences and desirability of various legal regimes.2 6 Second, it posits
efficiency, or wealth maximization, as an overriding objective of legal
rules.2 7
23. See Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming:Abstract Equality, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 201, 209
("Formal equality assumes it is possible to ignore an individual's sex."); Ann E. Freedman,
Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L. J. 913, 915-916 (1983) (legal
theory of equal rights challenges biological determinism and asserts that individuals should
be free to choose among social roles and careers on the basis of their individual inclinations
and talents); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 829
(1990) (liberal feminism argues "that women are just as rational as men and that women
should have equal opportunity with men to exercise their right to make rational, selfinterested choices").
24. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Rosemin Keshvani, The Role of Private Orderingin Family
Law: A Law and Economics Perspective, 41 U. TORONTOL.J. 533, 540 (1991) (describing
"evolving marriage paradigm" of equal partnership, in which the division of earning and
domestic functions results from mutual agreement between partners).
25. See, e.g., Ira M. Ellman, Should "The Theory of Alimony" Include Nonfinancial Losses
and Motivations, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 264 (arguing that the economic theory of alimony
"asks about the kind of behavior society wishes to encourage in marriage and attempts to
fashion an alimony remedy that eliminates the disincentives that would otherwise arise for
such behavior"); Elisabeth Landes, The Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 35-36
(1978) ("[Tlhe award and enforcement of alimony payments by the courts encourage optimal
resource allocation within marriage, increase the gain from marriage, and encourage the
formation, productivity, and stability of marriage.").
26. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10-11 (1984).
27. Efficiency theorists, when pressed, claim that they define wealth and efficiency expansively to include more than financial well-being. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60 (1983) (defining wealth of society as "the sum of all goods and services in
the society weighted by their values"). However, much law and economics writing-including
in the family law area-focuses primarily on material wealth. But if efficiency theorists truly
mean to define wealth expansively (i.e., to refer to general well-being or human satisfaction),
then economic analysis becomes both tautological and incoherent, particularly when more
than one person is involved. See Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 33,
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The efficiency argument in favor of alimony is premised upon three
central assumptions. First, efficiency theorists assume that married persons, like other rational individuals, seek to maximize their individual
welfare. Second, these theorists suggest that people maximize their individual welfare through the production and acquisition of commodities.2 8
Thus, efficiency theory conceptualizes marriage as a husband-wife partnership in which both parties desire to maximize joint production of commodities. 29 These commodities include not only traditional measures of market
wealth, such as income and material goods, but also so-called "household
commodities" such as home-cooked meals and time spent with children.3 °
They also include personal assets-enhancements in the ability of one or
both spouses to produce income or other commodities in the futurethat economists refer to as investments in human capital.3 1
Third, and perhaps most important for the economic justification for
alimony, efficiency theorists invoke the principle of comparative advantage
to argue that specialization within marriage enables spouses to maximize
their joint production of market and nonmarket commodities. 32 This principle holds that, to maximize overall production, the members of a household (or of any organization) should allocate their resources to various
activities according to the members' comparative or relative efficiencies in
those activities. 33 Just as businesses increase their output-and hence their
productivity-by having employees specialize in specific tasks or aspects of
the businesses, so too will married persons maximize their joint production
of commodities-and for efficiency theorists, their overall well-being-by

57, 75-83 (1992) (arguing that any attempt to measure social efficiency, as opposed to
individual well-being, violates the economist's commitment to methodological individualism
and runs afoul of the proscription on interpersonal comparisons of utility).
28. PARKMAN, supra note 1, at 27; see GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 20-24

(enlarged ed. 1991) [hereinafter BECKER, FAMILY] (discussing maximization of utility function for commodities).
29. See, e.g., PARKMAN, supra note 1, at 27-28; Landes, supra note 25, at 40.
30. PARKMAN, supra note 1, at 28; Landes, supra note 25, at 40 ("Marriages are ...

assumed to be husband-wife partnerships in which both parties desire to maximize their joint
expected income. The income of marriage is comprised of household commodities.. . which
are consumption or investment goods specific to the marriage, and the earnings of family
members .. ")
31. See generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 9 (2d ed. 1981) (noting that investments in human capital "influence future monetary and psychic income by increasing the
resources in people").
32. BECKER, FAMILY, supra note 28, at 32; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF

LAW 101-02 (2nd ed. 1986); see PARKMAN, supra note 1, at 28 (describing concepts of
specialization and comparative advantage in marriage and noting that specialization, while
neither absolute nor permanent, tends to increase among married men and women).
33. BECKER, FAMILY, supra note 28, at 32; see PARKMAN, supra note 1, at 28 (comparing
advantage of men in earning higher incomes to advantage of women in "delivering if not
raising children" and noting that women's lower earnings have made them the lower-cost
partner to provide child-rearing services).
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having each spouse specialize in the productive sector for which he or she
is comparatively better suited.
The economist's endorsement of marital specialization follows directly
from the economic explanation of why people marry. As Allen Parkman
explains, "[t]he economic analysis of the decision to marry focuses on the
parties' expectation that marriage will increase their individual welfarethat marriage will expand the 'commodities' available to them compared
with those available if they remained single.",3 4 The primary way that
marriage achieves this, according to efficiency theorists, is by reaping the
gains associated with specialization.3 5
Because specialization increases productivity, economic theorists contend that an efficient and optimally productive marriage is likely to entail a
pronounced division of labor, with one spouse specializing in marketoriented production and the other spouse specializing in the production of
nonmarket wealth, including the care and raising of children. Initially,
economic theorists were quite comfortable discussing and defending the
efficiency of such marital specialization along explicit gender lines. 36 That
is, theorists generally assumed that women, by virtue of their biology,
possessed a "natural" comparative advantage over men in household, as
opposed to market, production and that men enjoyed a correspondingly
"natural" comparative advantage in market, as opposed to non-market
work. 37 The efficient household, under this model, was one in which the
34. PARKMAN, supra note 1, at 26.

35. To illustrate this principle, Parkman hypothesizes a single man who can produce
either $50 of market commodities, or $20 of household commodities, or some combination of
the two, and a single woman who can produce either $50 of household commodities, or $20
of market commodities, or some combination of the two. If each remains a sole producer,
each must devote energy to producing both types of commodities. Assuming that both have
approximately equal preferences for the two types of commodities, each would choose a
production mix that lies in the middle of their respective production possibility frontiers;
thus, the man would produce $20 of market commodities and $12 of household commodities
and the woman would produce $12 of market commodities and $20 of household commodities. By joining forces and specializing, both can increase their overall welfare. If the man
specializes completely in market production and the woman specializes completely in
household production, then they can jointly produce $50 of market commodities and $50 of
household commodities. Assuming an equal division of output, each marital partner now has
access to more of each type of commodity than he or she did as a single producer. The
greater the disparity in the comparative advantages of the prospective spouses, the greater
the potential gain from pooling and therefore the greater the incentive to marry, as opposed
to remaining single. Id. at 29-30. For a critique of this illustration, see Margaret F. Brinig,
The Law and Economics of No-Fault Divorce, 26 FAM. L.Q. 453, 456-58 (1993) (reviewing
ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? (1992)).
36. See, e.g., BECKER, FAMILY, supra note 28, at 37-44 (discussing effect

of "intrinsic
differences between the sexes"); Landes, supra note 25, at 40 (calculating optimal degree of
household specialization based on extra time wife devotes to household activities in order to
free more of husband's time to market and earnings-generating activity).
37. E.g., BECKER, FAMILY, supra note 28, at 39 (discussing effects of "biological differences in comparative advantage between the sexes"). Note that this analysis does not
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husband specialized in market production and the wife specialized in
domestic work.
More modern efficiency theorists-perhaps recognizing the divisiveness
of these biological assumptions-generally disclaim reliance on intrinsic
gender differences. Instead, they link specialization to efficiency by emphasizing the unequal earning capacities of most husbands and wives, and by
asserting that men and women tend to invest differentially prior to marriage in sector-specific human capital.3 8 Ira Ellman, for example, asserts
that the economically rational married couple will "shift economic sacrifices from the higher earning spouse to the lower earning spouse, because
that shift will increase the income of the marital unit as a whole." 39
Similarly, Gary Becker, in the revised edition of his Treatise on the Family,
argues that even a small initial difference in the comparative advantages of
men and women with respect to market and non-market work-related,
for example, to women's role in giving birth or to wage discrimination in
favor of men-is likely to produce a high degree of gender-based 'specialization in marriage because of the reinforcing effects of additional investments in human capital.4 °
What does the economist's endorsement of specialization have to do
with the justification for alimony? The link is that specialization within
marriage is beneficial for both spouses only so long as the marriage stays
intact. Divorce changes the picture dramatically. In the absence of alimony
or a similar transfer of assets, the spouse who has specialized in household
production-who has invested in the marriage, rather than in the marketfinds herself economically disadvantaged relative to the spouse who has
specialized in market production. Not only has the domestic specialist
forgone the opportunity to develop and maintain her own market-oriented
human capital, but many of the domestic assets and capacities that she has
produced or enhanced during the marriage are of extremely limited economic value (and may indeed constitute an economic drain) in the event of
divorce.
A rational spouse-or a rational prospective spouse-who foresees the
possibility of these divorce-induced losses is likely to protect herself by
investing more in the market and less in the production of marriagecompare men to women in each sector; rather, it compares each gender's productivity in the
market to that same gender's productivity in the nonmarket sector.
38. See, e.g., BECKER, FAMILY, supra note 28, at 54-79 (supplement to Chapter 2) (describing theory of investment in human capital and noting that women tend to seek development
of generalized skills useful in roles as housewife and participant in labor force); PARKMAN,
supra note 1, at 28-33 (describing the increased production possibilities available as a result
of marriage when the male spouse specializes in income earning and the female spouse
specializes in household activities); Ellman, supra note 2, at 46-48.
39. Ellman, supra note 2, at 46.
40. See BECKER, FAMILY, supra note 28, at 3-5, 63.
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specific goods and services. Alternatively, or perhaps in addition, such a
rational, well-informed spouse may insist that her higher-earning partner
forgo some of his market-oriented production in order to assume a larger
share of childcare and other household responsibilities. 41 But while these
strategies are likely to reduce the disproportionate financial losses flowing
from divorce, they also reduce the productivity of the intact marriage,
because they decrease the degree of otherwise efficient marital specialization.4 2 As Ira Ellman explains, "the strategy the spouses have adopted to
reduce the financial loss flowing from marital failure also reduces the
financial benefits arising from the intact marriage. Part of the husband's
higher earning
potential goes unrealized, to both his detriment and his
43
wife's."
Because the efficiency theorist views wealth maximization as an overriding purpose of marriage, such a decrease in productivity both reduces the
overall attractiveness of marriage and increases the likelihood of divorce.
Because a nonspecialized marriage is less productive than a specialized
one, some prospective spouses will choose not to marry. 4 Meanwhile,
individuals who do marry but then engage in such a suboptimal division of
marital labor increase their risk of divorce, because other things being
equal, the level of satisfaction in nonspecialized marriages will be lower
than in marriages that adhere to a more efficient (i.e., wealth-maximizing)
division of spousal labor.45
Thus, the efficiency theorist argues, the possibility of financial losses
resulting from divorce distorts the incentives that would otherwise lead to
efficient, role-specialized behavior during marriage. Alimony is justified,
under this view, to remove these distorting incentives and to encourage
those spouses who are comparatively better suited for domestic work to
"do the right thing" and invest in their marriages rather than in the
market.
The economists' emphasis on specialization and efficiency does more
than provide a theoretical justification for alimony; it also plays a major
role in determining the availability and appropriate measure of any particular alimony award. Because the purpose of alimony, under this theory, is to

41. See Ellman, supra note 2, at 47.

42. See PARKMAN, supra note 1, at 36 ("People who do not want to specialize and do not
appreciate the commodities made available by their spouse do not gain very much from
marriage."); Ellman, supra note 2, at 47-48.
43. Ellman, supra note 2, at 47.
44. Id. (asserting that, today, men are particularly likely to be deterred); see Landes, supra
note 25, at 49, 62-63 (noting that specialization within marriage "promotes both the initial
formation and continued stability of marriages").
45. Ellman, supra note 2, at 47; see PARKMAN, supra note 1, at 36 ("The more people

commit themselves to specialized roles, the more they gain from marriage and the more they
lose from divorce.... Less specialization during marriage increases the probability of
divorce.")
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avoid discouraging a lower earning spouse from engaging in efficient
marital sharing behavior, an optimal award should neutralize the adverse
financial consequences of such sharing behavior for any particular divorcing spouse. The award should thus compensate each particular household
specialist for the value of the market opportunities she has forgone as a
result of the decision to invest primarily in the marriage.4 6 It should,
however, do no more than this.4 7 Thus, to the extent that income differentials between divorcing spouses are not attributable to specialization during marriage, but instead result from investments and choices made prior
to marriage, the efficiency justification is inapposite, and alimony is therefore unavailable.
To calculate a household specialist's compensable losses, the economist
would compare that spouse's earning capacity at the time of divorce with
the earning capacity that she would have enjoyed had she invested her
time in marketable skills instead of in marriage-specific activities.48 The
difference between these two figures, discounted to its present value,
would constitute the optimal alimony award.
Combining human capital theory with the economist's endorsement of
specialization produces a similar efficiency-based approach to financial
entitlements at divorce.4 9 For example, Allen Parkman argues that a
spouse who limits her employment or educational opportunities during
marriage in order to specialize in domestic production should be viewed as
having contributed separate property-in this case, a portion of her human
capital-to the marriage.5 ° Because separate property is generally returned to the individual who previously owned it in the event of divorce,
Parkman argues that the spouse who sacrifices human capital to the
marriage should be compensated for her loss. 5 1 Parkman would measure

46. Ellman, supra note 2, at 51-52; see Landes, supra note 25, at 46 (defining efficient

alimony award as the value of opportunities forgone by wife as result of making optimal
marital investment in household activities).
47. See Ellman, supra note 25, at 265 & n.18 ("If the law provides that the claimant be
'made whole'-put back in the position she would have been in had she not engaged in
marital sharing behavior-the disincentive that would otherwise be present is eliminated.").

48. Ellman, supra note 2, at 78.
49. Although Parkman would rely primarily on property division rather than alimony as
the vehicle for effectuating these divorce-related financial adjustments, his underlying theory
closely resembles Ellman's.
50. See Allen M. Parkman, The Recognition of Human Capital as Property in Divorce
Settlements, 40 ARK. L. REV. 439, 449-50 (1987) [hereinafter, Parkman, Human Capital]

(comparing contribution of human capital during marriage to situation in which an individual contributes asset prior to marriage that would be considered separate property);
PARKMAN,

supra note 1, at 132-34 (discussing methods of recognizing and compensating for

decreases in a supporting spouse's human capital during marriage); id. at 151-52 (proposing
model statute). For a critique of the human capital approach endorsed by Parkman and
other theorists, see Regan, supra note 13, at 2320.
51. Parkman, Human Capital, supra note 50, at 449-50. Like Ellman, Parkman would

measure the compensable loss by comparing the income stream that the sacrificing spouse
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the compensable loss by comparing the sacrificing spouse's expected income stream after divorce with the income that the spouse could have
expected had she never left the workforce.5 2
Parkman relies heavily on efficiency notions to explain why such adjustments are necessary. In particular, Parkman argues that the failure to
compensate divorcing wives for human capital contributions encourages
women to behave inefficiently by causing them to "pursue employment or
education when the benefits to the family may not exceed the costs out of
5 3 Requirtheir concern about their situation if their marriage is dissolved.
ing compensation for human capital contributions at the time of divorce
could provide appropriate financial protection to spouses5 4who specialize in
household production at a significantly lower social cost.

III.

ADVANTAGES OF THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE

Is the efficiency justification for alimony compatible with feminist approaches to marriage and divorce, and is it likely to alleviate the disparate
financial effects of divorce on women and the children for whom they
overwhelmingly continue to care? The answer to both questions, I think, is
largely no. But the economic justification for alimony offers some tangible
benefits to women. Moreover, the economic approach provides some insights that may be useful in understanding-and ultimately in reorderingthe relationship among law, family, and gender relations.
First, the economic justification represents a distinct improvement over
the early reformers' notion of alimony as a short-term transition payment.
In many cases, compensating a divorcing woman for the human capital
losses she has incurred as a result of her investment in domestic activities
is likely to provide a financial remedy that significantly exceeds that available under current alimony doctrine. Moreover, this economic rationale
makes clear why the notion of a short-term transition payment was so
inadequate for so many women: merely facilitating a woman's return to the
paid labor market fails utterly to take account of the long-term disparities
55
in earning capacity that result from the division of labor during marriage.
can expect to receive at the time of divorce with the income stream that she could have
expected if she had never left the workforce. Id. at 450. However, Parkman would award the
sacrificing spouse only half the value of this difference because he claims that she has already
received half the value of her sacrifice. Id.
52. Id.
53. PARKMAN, supra note 1, at 121.

54. Id.
55. See Arthur B. Cornell, Jr., When Two Become One, and then Come Undone: An
OrganizationalApproach to Marriage and Its Implicationsfor Divorce Law, 26 FAM. L.Q. 103,

130-32 (1992) (advocating compensation based on lost earnings capacity as sound basis of
tying remedy to actual losses); Rutherford, supra note 15, at 563-64 (criticizing Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act for its failure to compensate divorced spouse for diminished
earning capacity and loss of future income).
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The economic justification thus takes an important step toward recognizing that women (and the occasional man) who assume primary responsibility for dependent care and other domestic tasks make important
contributions to a marriage, and that it is appropriate to compensate them
for those contributions in the event that a marriage fails. More generally,
the economic approach to divorce appropriately recognizes that the family
is an important locus of production, as opposed to merely an emotional or
affective realm-a productive center, as well as a haven in a heartless
world.56
The economic justification also acknowledges what the early reformers
chose to ignore: that decisions about the allocation of work and family
responsibilities during marriage are likely to have economic consequences
that endure long after a marriage is formally dissolved. Thus, it is neither
realistic nor appropriate to expect instant rehabilitation or a clean financial break.
Second, the economic justification affords divorcing women and their
legal advocates a powerful language in which to frame their legal claims.5 7
Armed with economic theory, a financially dependent spouse can press for
post-divorce financial support not merely because she needs it, but also
because she has earned it, either by sacrificing her own economic opportunities for the sake of her family or by contributing to the enhancement of
her husband's earning power. In this sense, the economic rationale for
alimony restores, to at least some divorcing women, an element that the
switch from a fault to a no-fault divorce regime took away-the ability to
frame their alimony claims in justice-based, as opposed to merely needsbased, terms. Moreover, because the economic theory does not depend on
traditional notions of marital fault, the theory avoids the constraints,
injustices, and gender stereotypes of the fault-based system of divorce.5 8
Third, the economists' emphasis on human capital as a valuable asset
breaks down the sharp distinction that family law has traditionally drawn
between alimony and property division. This breakdown is useful because
it comports with the general skepticism of feminist theories toward dichotomies and fixed legal categories. Moreover, breaking down the property
56. The textual reference is to CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD
(1977).
57. Feminist theory has long emphasized the power of naming-of ascribing meaning to
the world and determining which things count as cognizable categories and claims. See, e.g,
Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 18-20

(1988) (emphasizing the critique of the male power of naming); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking
Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE

DAME L. REV. 886, 895-906 (1989) (arguing that the patriarchal bias in legal language can
distort what women have to say); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword:
Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 61 (1987) ("Feminist work has named the power

of naming.").
58. See Singer, supra note 5, at 1110-11 (describing the "sex discriminatory nature of the
most common grounds for a fault-based divorce").
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versus alimony distinction suggests that many of the arguments used to
justify an equal (or at least an equitable) sharing of marital property upon
divorce also justify an equitable (if not an equal) division of a couple's
post-divorce earnings, at least when those earnings are attributable to
investments and decisions made during marriage.
At its core, the principle of equal property division reflects the notion
that each spouse contributes equally to a marriage and is therefore entitled to share equally in its benefits and losses.5 9 Human capital theory
teaches that the material assets which a couple accumulates provide, at
best, only a partial accounting of the benefits attributable to most marriages.6 ° To obtain a true measure of marital gains and losses, one must
also consider changes in the spouses' respective earning capacities during
the period of the marriage. Thus, human capital theory suggests that to
fulfill the promise of equal property division, divorce law must look beyond
the couple's material assets and reallocate some portion of the spouses'
future income.
Fourth, the ex ante focus of the economic approach calls attention to
what Carl Schneider has termed the channeling function of family lawthe incentives created by legal rules and the effect that such rules are likely
to have on various forms of family behavior.6 1 Thus, while conventional
justifications for alimony tended to be primarily backward looking, economic theories are explicitly forward looking in that they seek to generate
62
rules that encourage particular kinds of marital behavior. This focus on
the ex ante effects of legal rules, including rules governing the financial
consequences of divorce, is valuable to feminists for at least two reasons.
First, it provides a useful antidote to the overly particularistic and reactive
orientation of much of family'law by focusing attention on influencing
behavior rather than on responding to it. Second, an ex ante orientation
tends to undermine the myths-so often used to dismiss feminist reform
proposals directed at the family-that law is inherently incapable of affecting relations within the family and that legal reform efforts purportedly
directed toward that end are largely futile.6 3

59. See id. at 1114 (noting that equitable division of marital property represents an "initial
application" of theory that spouses are equal investors entitled to equal proceeds of

marriage).
60. See Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense For Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the MaritalInvestor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REV. 379, 381-386 (1990) (applying

human capital to family investment decisions); Parkman, Human Capital, supra note 50, at

439-41.
61. See generally Carl E. Schneider, The ChannellingFunction in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 495 (1992).

62. Ellman, supra note 2, at 51-52.
63. For examples of such arguments, see DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., GENDER JUSTICE 173-76
(1986) and GILBERT Y. STEINER, THE FUTILITY OF FAMILY POLICY 177-217 (1981).
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Of course, economic theorists are neither the first nor the only scholars
to focus on the ex ante effects of various divorce compensation schemes.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the marital behavior that the efficiency
theorist seeks to encourage is in women's long-term interest. Herma Hill
Kay, for example, has cautioned against adopting alimony schemes that
"encourage future couples entering marriage to make choices that will be
economically disabling for women, thereby perpetuating their traditional
financial dependence upon men and contributing to their inequality with
men at divorce." ' But focusing on the ex ante effects of various legal rules
at least allows us to talk explicitly about what sorts of marital and family
behavior we wish to encourage, rather than pretending that these are
purely private or personal matters or that they are somehow outside the
scope of appropriate family law and policy discourse.

IV. A

FEMINIST CRITIQUE

A. THE PITFALLS OF MARITAL SPECIALIZATION

For feminists, perhaps the most troubling aspect of the dominant economic theory of alimony is the theory's reliance on the efficiency-and
hence the desirability-of role specialization during marriage. Although
modern efficiency theorists prefer to characterize alimony as compensation
for decreases in human capital,6 5 or as a way of removing incentives that
inhibit efficient sharing behavior, 66 their arguments in favor of both concepts rest centrally on the desirability of role specialization within marriage and on the corresponding undesirability of marriages that deviate
from such an optimal division of household labor. Moreover, despite
recent attempts by some economic theorists to delink marital specialization from gender roles, 67 the two remain closely, perhaps inextricably,
connected.
Allen Parkman is most candid about the centrality of specialization to
the economic theory of alimony. He asserts early in his book that a primary
problem with the current divorce regime is that it ignores the effect of
marriage on the income earning capacities of the spouses and thereby
"result[s] in undesirable decisions being made during marriage."6 8 What
are these undesirable decisions? They turn out to be inefficient attempts
by married couples to share equally in the work of raising children. As

64. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective On No-Fault Divorce And Its

Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 60 (1987).
65.

PARKMAN,

supra note 1, at 6-8.

66. ElIman, supra note 2, at 50.
67. See sources cited supra notes 38-40.

68.

PARKMAN,

supra note 1, at 2.
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Parkman explains:
The arrival of children usually results in one party, usually the woman,
increasing the emphasis that she places on household production. The
parents may be tempted to share the responsibility for child rearing, but
usually it will be less costly to the couple for just one parent to alter his
or her employment than for both to alter their employment. The lower
average wages available 69to women make the mother the lower-cost
provider of child rearing.
Similarly, Ira Eliman asserts that using alimony to reallocate the financial consequences of divorce is desirable in order to remove distorting
incentives to the optimal allocation of marital roles and duties.70 Again,
this optimal allocation turns out to involve a high degree of specialization,
with the lower-earning spouse (generally the woman) assuming the bulk of
childcare and other domestic responsibilities. Indeed, Ellman goes so far
as to assert that marriages that reject this optimal division of labor-that
is, marriages in which a higher earning husband and a lower earning wife
attempt to share childrearing and other domestic tasks equally or attempt
to switch roles-are more likely than traditional marriages to end in
being equal, the level of satisfaction in such
divorce "since, other things
71
lower.",
be
will
marriages
This attempt to justify alimony as a mechanism for promoting efficient
specialization within marriage is problematic on grounds both internal and
external to economics. Internally, economic theory itself casts doubt on the
efficiency of role specialization during marriage. As Margaret Brinig and
June Carbone have pointed out, the standard efficiency argument for
marital specialization considers only specialization between husbands and
wives; it does not consider the possibility of specialization among women.72
69. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
70. Ellman, supra note 2, at 49-50.
71. Id. at 47. Ellman also asserts that because such an egalitarian marriage "is less

profitable than a more traditional marriage, some parties might choose not to enter it in the
first place, even though they would enter a traditional marriage." Id. Gary Becker argues

more generally that as women's earnings increase, the likelihood of divorce also rises
because such higher earnings reduce both the demand for children and the advantages of the
sexual division of labor, thus reducing the gain from marriage. BECKER, FAMILY, supra note
28, at 54-56.
72. Brinig, supra note 35, at 456-57; June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, & the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1489-90 (1990). Carbone

explains that in the nineteenth century, specialization meant that married, middle-class
women did not work outside the home, and husbands played little role childrearing. In the

late twentieth century, by contrast, "specialization involves women specializing among
themselves to provide childcare so that many mothers work outside the home, entrusting
care of their children to other women paid for caring for more children than just their own."
Id. at 1490.
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This omission is particularly striking when one considers that the most
dramatic change in the latter part of the 20th century has not been a
decrease in specialization within the nuclear family, but rather an increase
in specialization among women in the provision of child care and other
domestic services.7 3 Yet the same economic argument that would support
specialization within the family should support specialization among women
as well. Thus, from a pure efficiency standpoint, the most productive
household today may be one in which both spouses engage in full-time
market work and the bulk of the domestic tasks, including childcare, are
performed by a low-wage employee-almost certainly another woman, and
quite likely a woman of color. 74 This is hardly a solution that most feminists would be inclined to endorse.
Even if one focuses solely on specialization between husband and wife,
the link between specialization and efficiency may be more problematic
than that suggested by the relatively simplistic theory of comparative
advantage that underlies the economic justification for alimony. Margaret
Brinig, for example, has suggested that the standard economic account of
marital specialization fails to consider important psychic costs associated
with specialization, such as the cost to women who are not working outside
the home, but who would like to be, and the cost to men who are working
long hours, but who would like to spend more time with their children.7 5
Factoring in these psychic costs, and assuming at least some diminishing
marginal returns from additional increases in productivity, suggests that,
for many couples, the most "efficient" marriage is not one characterized by
a high degree of specialization. Rather, an efficient union would entail
both partners having significant ties to the paid labor force and spending
significant time with their children.7 6 Encouraging such "nonspecialized,"
but child-centered, unions may have significant societal benefits as well,
including encouraging all parents to invest more heavily in developing
their children's human capital.7 7 Unfortunately, the strong commitment to
specialization that underlies the economic efficiency justification for alimony may hinder the sort of workplace and other societal changes that are
necessary to facilitate these nonspecialized, child-centered unions.

73. Carbone, supra note 72, at 1465-66; see June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage:Feminist Ideology, Economic Change and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953,

990 n.168 (1991) (discussing the entry of women into the workforce resulting in greater
specialization among women in domestic work).
74. Twila Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the Searchfor Theory, 82 GEO.
L.J. 2481, 2498, 2509-11 (1994).

75. Brinig, supra note 72, at 457.
76. Id. at 457-58.
77. See generally Lynn A. Stout, Some Thoughts on Poverty and Failure in the Market for
Children's Human Capital, 81 GEO. L. J. 1945 (1993) (examining imperfections in human

capital markets).
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Arlie Hochschild's documentation of married women's "second shift"
also casts doubt on the efficiency of the traditional division of household
labor. In her detailed study of married couples, Hochschild found that
women who earn less than their husbands and who assume primary responsibility for childcare and other domestic tasks often accomplish this juggling act not by limiting their market production (as the theory of
comparative advantage would predict), but by reducing their already scarce
leisure time. This finding also suggests a potential inefficiency in the
specialized household, as the cost of reducing a husband's relatively abundant leisure time should be less than the cost of reducing by an equivalent
amount either the wife's paid employment or her relatively scarce leisure
time.79 This, in turn, suggests that the tenacity of the gender-based division
of labor within marriage may be less a reflection of efficiency and more a
manifestation of men's continuing power over women-or, to put it in
economic terms, of successful strategic and rent-seeking behavior on the
part of husbands.
These arguments suggest that marital specialization may not be nearly
so efficient as economic theorists such as Becker, Ellman, and Parkman
maintain, if, indeed, it is efficient at all. As an advocate of-and aspiring
participant in-nonspecialized marriage, I applaud this conclusion. But
this conclusion devastates the dominant economic justification for alimony.
If specialization within marriage is not efficient, then the economic justification for alimony evaporates. Alimony is no longer necessary to encourage
"optimal role allocation" or to remove "distorting incentives" to otherwise
efficient marital behavior. Of course there may well be reasons other than
efficiency to want to encourage sharing behavior during marriage or to
protect spouses (or parents) who, for whatever reason, have assumed
primary responsibility for childcare and other domestic tasks, but normative efficiency analysis cannot provide us with those reasons. 80 Thus, feminists (and others) who would rely primarily on economic efficiency
arguments to justify post-divorce income sharing may well be boarding a
sinking ship.
And even if marital specialization were efficient, feminists would still be
reluctant to endorse it (or to build a theory of alimony around it) because

78. ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION
AT HOME (1989); see VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 76

(1988) (noting that although there has been a doubling of the women to men ratio of "money
income" between 1960 and 1986, men had more and women had less leisure time); Gillian K.
Hadfield, Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82
GEO. L.J. 89, 97 (1993) (discussing the reduction in a woman's leisure time as an inefficiency
of the household).
79. Hadfield, supra note 78, at 97-98.
80. See Lawson, supra note 27, at 75 ("The normative branch of law and economics
instructs decisionmakers to use social efficiency as a guide, even if not the sole guide, to
conduct.").
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of the link between specialization and gender inequality. Although both
Ellman and Parkman assert that their endorsement of marital specialization does not constitute an endorsement of gender-based specialization,
both concede that, in most marriages today, the lower-earning spouse is
likely to be the wife. What these theorists fail to recognize, however, is that
the woman is likely to be the lower-earning spouse in most marriages
precisely because women have historically borne-and to a large extent
continue to bear-a disproportionate share of household labor. 8 ' Indeed,
economists themselves have increasingly identified the sex-based division
of household labor as one of the primary determinants of the persistent
wage gap between men and women workers.82 By endorsing a theory of
alimony that rests on the efficiency (and hence the desirability) of role
specialization within the family, economic efficiency theorists thus risk
perpetuating, perhaps unwittingly, women's economic marginalization.
The economists' endorsement of marital specialization is also problematic because it ignores the effect of such specialization on power differentials within the family. Studies of decisionmaking and conflict within
marriage have consistently shown "that, on average, husbands have more
power than wives, that male power is stronger when the wife is exclusively
a homemaker than when she is employed outside the home, and that male
power is less extreme when women have higher earnings." 8 3 Recent theoretical work suggests that such gender-based power differentials are attributable not only to disparities in market earnings, but also to the dynamic of
specialization-in particular, to the fact that wives tend to invest disproportionately in relationship-specific human capital, while husbands' human
capital investments during marriage are largely portable.8 4 This asymmetry
in portable investments affects not only the parties' relative economic
positions at divorce, but also their ability to bargain during marriage. Both
sociological exchange theory and game theory suggest that the better one's
alternatives outside marriage, and the worse one's partner's alternatives,
the more one can afford to risk the other partner leaving by bargaining
harder within the marriage. 85 Focusing on the overall efficiency (or productivity) of the household unit renders invisible-and hence, unproblematicthese gender-based power differentials. Put more generally, the economist's
81. Carbone, supra note 72, at 1490-91; see Hadfield, supra note 78, at 96-97 (suggesting
that the structure of household labor accounts for a large fraction of the gender gap in
compensation).
82. E.g., Hadfield, supra note 78, at 96.
83. Paula England & Barbara S. Kilbourne, Markets, Marriages, and Other Mates: The
Problem of Power, in BEYOND THE MARKETPLACE: RETHINKING ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 151,

165 (Roger Friedland & A.F. Robertson eds., 1990).

84. See id. at 163, 173-78 (discussing the nature of relationship-specific investments,
generally attributed to women, and portable investments, generally attributed to men, and
the role such investments play in a marriage).
85. Id. at 177.
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focus on the household as an efficient, productive unit ignores both the
distribution of resources within that unit and the effect of specialization on
that distribution.8 6
The endorsement of marital specialization that underlies the efficiency
justification for alimony is also problematic because it seems designed to
encourage women to abandon their careers for the sake of their marriages,
in exchange for a promise to "hold them harmless" financially should the
marriage dissolve. 87 Even if providing alimony in the event of a divorce
provided full financial compensation, such a structure ignores other rewards, including the intellectual, emotional, and social benefits associated
with participation in the paid labor market. On an aggregate level, it also
ignores the increase in social and political power that accompanies a
group's widespread participation in the market.
B. ISOLATING THE MARRIED COUPLE

The economic theory of alimony is also troubling from a feminist perspective because it focuses almost exclusively on the interests of the married
couple in isolation.8 8 Curiously absent from the theory is any reference to
societal interests that go beyond the particular married couple.8 9 Similarly
absent is any serious attention to the effect of various divorce compensation schemes on children, even though much empirical evidence suggests
that "[wihen couples divorce, their separation may exact a higher financial
and emotional toll on their children and on the society that has to deal
with their children than it does on the couple themselves." 9 ° As a number
of feminist scholars have pointed out, divorce compensation schemes that
insist on treating non-custodial fathers' human capital as their personal
property "not only impoverish[ ] women, but also result[ ] in systematic
disinvestment in children." 9 1 Conceptualizing the "problem" that alimony
is designed to solve solely in terms of the spouses' joint economic interests
is likely to perpetuate this disinvestment.
The same criticism applies to any attempt to justify alimony as simply a
set of "contractual default rules" that rational spouses entering marriage
would have agreed to had they bargained explicitly about the possibility of
divorce. To adopt law and economics terminology, to the extent that
marriage can usefully be analyzed as a private contract, it is a contract
86. See, e.g., Diana Strassman, Not a Free Market: The Rhetoric of DisciplinaryAuthority in
Economics, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 22, at 54, 58-59 (criticizing standard

economic model of the family for ignoring unequal distribution of resources and power
among family members).
87. Carbone, supra note 72, at 1493.
88. See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 2, at 40-50; Landes, supra note 25, at 36, 49-5 1.

89. Carbone, supra note 72, at 1488-89.
90. Id.
91. Joan C. Williams, Women and Property, in A PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY 182, 185 (Richard
H. Chused ed., 1993) [hereinafter Williams, Women and Property].
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whose formation, and especially whose termination, is likely to be associated with a particularly high level of externalities.9 2 Thus, reliance on
either notions of individual consent or market-based measures of efficiency
to determine the unarticulated terms of the contract or the intended
consequences of contract termination is likely to be problematic.

C. THE ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION APPLIED

Another major problem with the efficiency rationale for alimony is the
peculiar and seemingly unfair results it produces when applied to particular fact situations. It is useful to examine these applications, both to try to
contextualize the economic notions on which these theorists rely, and
because this process of application and contextualization reveals some of
the troubling premises upon which the economic justification rests. A key
tenet of the economic efficiency justification is that a divorcing spouse is
entitled to alimony only when her activities during marriage have resulted
in a decrease in her own income earning capacity. A spouse who has
suffered no such postmarital reduction in earning power is not entitled to
alimony, no matter how great her financial need, how significant her
marital investment, or how much her husband (and children) have benefited from her caretaking and other domestic activities.
Therefore, although the efficiency justification provides substantial compensation to the high-powered corporate attorney who quits her job to stay
home with children (or who switches from corporate practice to a less
lucrative, but more flexible, law teaching job), it completely denies alimony
to the full-time mother and homemaker who never aspired to a career
outside marriage or whose market activities prior to marriage offered little
opportunity for career advancement. 93 That these two women may have
assumed identical roles during marriage (or, indeed, that the career homemaker may have invested more heavily in household production) is irrelevant to the alimony inquiry because, according to the efficiency justification,
the function of alimony is to compensate for losses attributable to marriage, not to correct for what economists tend to characterize as gen-

92. One obvious type of externality involves the effect of marriage termination on children. See Carbone, supra note 72, at 1488-89.
93. Jane W. Ellis, New Rules For Divorce: Transition Payments, 32 FAM. L.J. 601, 609-10
(1994); see Carbone, supra note 72, at 1497 (characterizing Ellman's "lost earnings" approach to alimony as "a system that appears to be designed with only young urban professionals in mind"). Ellman's requirement that, except where children are involved, marital
sharing behavior must have increased aggregate marital income in order to provide a basis
for alimony also means that dependent spouses in childless marriages are unlikely to qualify
for alimony, even when their domestic activities have resulted in a clear loss of career
opportunities. See Ellman, supra note 2, at 63-66 (discussing the application of alimony rules
in specific case scenarios).
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eral social inequalities. As Ira Ellman explains:
We allow the wife a claim when she sacrifices her earning capacity to
advance her husband's. But where one spouse enters the marriage with a
great fortune or a lucrative talent, and the other has no similar asset, we
have a different situation. Divorce law cannot remedy all of life's inequalia couple to leave their marriageas
ties, and it is perfectly reasonablefor such
94
unequally endowed as they entered it.

This statement, and the results it attempts to justify, highlight at least
four significant shortcomings in the economic approach to alimony. First,
the economic approach fixates on compensation for loss, and pays little
attention to identifying or apportioning equitably the marriage-related
gains enjoyed by many primary wage-earners. Second, the economic approach relies on the market both to identify loss and to value it, thus
magnifying and perpetuating labor market discrimination against women.
Third, the economic justification insists on examining the alimony claimant
in isolation; it thus denies the importance of the spouses' relative economic positions. Finally, the theory's approach to compensation rests on
an unpersuasive and unworkable dichotomy between losses that can be
traced to a particular marriage and "tough luck" economic vulnerability
for which individual husbands cannot and should not be held responsible.
This purported dichotomy fails to appreciate the interdependence of the
gendered division of household labor and the so-called choices that individuals make before entering into a particular marriage.9 5
1. The Emphasis on Loss
The efficiency theorists' preoccupation with loss causes them to largely
ignore the human capital gains that accrue during many marriages. Empirical evidence shows that marriage not only depletes a wife's stock of human
capital, it also significantly enhances a husband's. 96 When economic theorists do discuss gains in human capital, it is generally for the purpose of
showing why a supporting spouse should not be entitled to share in those
gains, even if she provided the funding or the domestic services that made
their acquisition possible. Thus, Allen Parkman asserts that even where a
professional degree is earned (and financed) during marriage, it is generally inaccurate to attribute its value to the marriage, because most of the
94. Ellman, supra note 2, at 75 (emphasis added).
95. See Hadfield, supra note 78, at 95-96 (noting connection between male-female wage
gap and sex-based division of labor within the home); cf. Vicki Shultz, Telling Stories About
Women and Work: JudicialInterpretationsof Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases
Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1749, 1815-39 (1990) (exploring the
impact of workplace structure and culture on women's work-related preferences).
96. See, e.g., FUCHS, supra note 78, at 60 ("In contrast to women, married men earn more
than unmarried men at every age."); Carbone, supra note 4, at 184-85 (discussing studies).
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investment necessary to obtain the degree will have occurred prior to the
marriage.9 7 "Under normal circumstances, the investment in human capital prior to marriage will be so large and essential relative to the investment after marriage that
an individual's human capital should be treated
98
property.,
separate
as
The economic theory's reluctance to recognize or apportion gains flows
directly from its narrow view of the purpose of divorce-related financial
transfers. Remember that, for the efficiency theorist, the primary purpose
of alimony is to eliminate divorce-related disincentives to economically
rational sharing behavior during marriage. 99 To serve that purpose, an
alimony award need only "make good" the loss incurred by a spouse who
has invested primarily in her marriage, including in her partner's education or career.1°° Any additional reallocation would constitute a "windfall"
to the domestic specialist and would deprive the primary wage-earner of
something that is rightfully his.101 The economic approach to alimony thus
leaves unchallenged what Joan Williams has described as the key legal
mechanism that updates coverture and systematically impoverishes
women
10 2
and their children-the maxim that "he who earns it, owns it.'
The efficiency justification's inattention to marital gains, coupled with its
focus on the market to measure value, also causes it to overlook one of the
most important benefits that marriage bestows on a primary wage earner:
the opportunity to be both a parent and what feminists have termed an
"ideal worker."' 3 Thus, in both fully and partially specialized marriages,
97. PARKMAN, supra note 1, at 40-41; Parkman, supra note 50, at 447-49.

98. Parkman, supra note 50, at 448. Parkman would, however, reimburse a supporting
spouse who had provided funding for the degree. Id. at 448-49.
99. See ElIman, supra note 2, at 56 ("This theory of alimony... seek[s] only to make sure
that on divorce neither spouse is left with residual effects that would distort marital

decisionmaking.")
100. See Ellman, supra note 25, at 276.

101. See Parkman, supra note 50, at 447-48 ("The human capital that individuals possess
at the time of marriage are separate property just as much as if they had owned portfolios of
stocks and bonds."). Some economic theorists have also suggested that permitting reallocation of human capital gains would give lower earning spouses an incentive to engage in
"strategic divorce" in order to appropriate a large portion of the returns to a primary
wage-earner's "innate ability." See Severin Borenstein & Paul N. Courant, How to Carve A
Medical Degree: Human CapitalAssets in Divorce Settlements, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 992, 1004

(1989) ("The O'Brien rule [treating a professional degree acquired during marriage as
divisible marital property] with a high tax rate can induce the investing spouse to completely
forgo rents that could have been generated from an invest-support relationship and can
provide strong incentives for the supporting spouse to engage in strategic divorce.");
Cornell, supra note 55, at 123 (allowing division of marriage-related benefits "may give an
incentive to the spouse losing at breakdown to end the marriage at a strategic point to collect
the judgment").
102. Williams, Women and Property, supra note 91, at 185; see Joan Williams, Is Coverture
Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2250, 2253 (1994).
103. See Joan C. Williams, DeconstructingGender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 822-834 (1989)
[hereinafter Williams, DeconstructingGender] (discussing male life patterns as they affect the
structure of wage labor).
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the spouse who specializes in market production generally enjoys most-if
not all-of the benefits associated with parenthood. For example, the
primary wage-earner generally enjoys -at least an equal voice in major
decisions about the children-particularly if those decisions involve the
expenditure of money-and he is most often a full recipient of his children's affection.1 "4 What the economic justification fails to acknowledge is
that a husband's ability to be both a parent and an ideal worker depends
critically on his wife's assumption of primary childcare responsibilitieswhether or not10 5that assumption of responsibility results in a postmarital
economic loss.
Moreover, the ability to be both a participating parent and an ideal
worker is a benefit that divorcing husbands increasingly retain in full, at
least for as long as they choose to do so. Recent reforms in child custody
law have protected fathers' decisionmaking authority and access to children after divorce, without substantially reducing mothers' primary caretaking responsibilities.1 " 6 Indeed, a recent study of post-divorce parenting
arrangements in California reports that while most children continue to
live with (and be cared for by) their mothers, joint legal custody-that is
10 7
equal parental decisionmaking authority-"has now become the norm."
In many ways, this custody arrangement reproduces precisely the dominant parenting pattern during marriage, but without the corresponding
financial sharing that such an allocation of parental rights and responsibilities assumed.
Thus, at least in marriages involving children, divorce is likely to produce an imbalance of gains, as well as a one-sided loss of earning capacity.
Although both ex-spouses continue to enjoy the benefits of parenthood,
only the primary wage-earner continues simultaneously to reap the financial and nonfinancial rewards associated with full participation in the
market. The economic justification for alimony, by focusing narrowly on

104. See, e.g., PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 56-59 (1983)
(finding that husbands generally dominate family decisionmaking, particularly where at least
one partner adheres to male-provider philosophy); SUZANNE FIELDS, LIKE FATHER, LIKE
DAUGHTER: How FATHER SHAPES THE WOMAN HIS DAUGHTER BECOMES 85 (1983) (emphasizing the importance to daughters of fathers who fulfill traditional male roles); ROBERT L.
GRISWALD, FATHERHOOD IN AMERICA 247-54, 260-69 (1993) (discussing the rise of the
"nurturing father" and the importance of fathering to children and to men); SUSAN MULLER
OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 156-59 (1989) (explaining that spouse with higher
income and work status generally enjoys greater power within family, while resources such as
domestic services and childrearing tend to be negatively correlated with marital power).
105. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra note 103, at 831; Joan C. Williams, Sameness
Feminism and the Work/Family Conflict, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 347, 352-53 (1990).
106. See generally Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, ProfessionalLanguage, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988); Jana B. Singer &
William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497 (1988).
107. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD 73-75, 106-07
(1992).
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compensation for loss, and by ignoring nonmarket gains, renders invisible
and unremediable such child-related imbalances.
The economic theory's emphasis on loss is also troubling from a feminist
perspective because of the victim imagery it invokes. Under the economic
approach, a woman who has specialized in household production has
"forgone opportunities" and incurred losses that she and the legal system
must repair. In this sense, the economic justification perpetuates the early
reformers' notion of an alimony claimant as a fallen woman who must be
"rehabilitated" or made whole.1 °8 Under both approaches, "[w]omen are
measured in terms of a male model of full workforce participation and
compensated to the extent they fall short."1 °9 Moreover, under both approaches, the expectation is that once rehabilitated, the woman will seize
the economic moment and retake her rightful place as a full-time market
participant-at least until she marries again and can efficiently specialize
in the household sector.
2. The Market As the Exclusive Measure of Value
The dominant economic justification for alimony is also flawed because
it relies exclusively on the market both to identify compensable losses and
to measure the amount of compensation due. Under the economic rationale, a woman's domestic contributions justify post-divorce income sharing
only if she can point to a decline in her ability to command a market wage.
That same decline in market worth also determines the amount of compensation that she can expect. In essence, then, the economic efficiency
approach looks exclusively to forgone market opportunities to assign a
value to a woman's domestic labor. Although such an approach seems
preferable to older economic theories that tended to ignore entirely the
value of nonmarket labor, defining value in terms of lost market opportunities risks perpetuating labor market discrimination against women and
reinforcing the market's devaluation of work traditionally associated with
women. Using lost market opportunities to value a woman's domestic
labor also differentiates among women along class and racial lines. It was
in part to avoid these pitfalls that equitable distribution reforms often
invoked notions of equal partnership, rather than attempting to assess the
market value of women's domestic services, in the context of dividing
marital property."'
108. See O'Connell, supra note 7, at 503-05 (discussing victim-oriented conception of
rehabilitative alimony); Jane Rutherford & Barbara Tisher, Equalizing the Cost of Divorce
Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: Maintenance Awards in Illinois, 23 LoY. U.

CHI.

L.J. 459, 483 (1992) ("The very concept of 'rehabilitation' implies that there is something
wrong with being a homemaker.").
109. Carbone, supra note 4, at 196.
110. See

LAWRENCE GOLDEN,

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION

OF PROPERTY 262-64 & n.168

(1983 & 1993 Cumulative Supp.) (discussing cases).
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Moreover, the dominant economic approach provides no basis for compensating women for what, in many cases, may be the most significant loss
associated with divorce: the loss of the marital status itself. As Ira Ellman
acknowledges, these gender-based losses are likely to be particularly significant for women whose talents and preferences are consistent with the
traditional marriage model. Thus, the woman who either wants-or is
socialized from an early age to assume-the traditional female role of
homemaker, mother, nurturer, and helper has a great deal to lose from
divorce that the economic justification does not consider claimworthy. At
the same time, the economist's endorsement of specialization within marriage as an efficient (and therefore desirable) mode of organizing market
and household production impedes efforts to change the socialization
patterns that produce these gendered preferences.
The economic efficiency approach thus produces a cruel irony: In essence it is those women who "buy in" earliest and most completely to the
notions of specialization and comparative advantage extolled by efficiency
theorists who are most adversely affected by the economic justification for
alimony. And it is those men who, by virtue of marriage, have most
successfully maximized the gains from specialization who are able most
effectively to monopolize those gains in the event of divorce. As Margaret
Brinig and June Carbone have pointed out, whether for efficiency or other
reasons, many men who have accumulated substantial market wealth or
who anticipate pursuing demanding careers prefer to marry women whose
income potential is less than their own, but who bring other, nonmarket
assets to the marriage.1 11 Under the economic theory of alimony, these
men essentially get to have it both ways: they enjoy the benefits of their
wives' premarital specialization while disclaiming all responsibility for
remedying the disparate effects of that specialization in the event of
divorce.
3. The Importance of Relative Spousal Income
The dominant economic approach to alimony is relentlessly nonrelational. Not only does it justify alimony exclusively on efficiency grounds,
but it also focuses on a single spouse's change in economic position. Thus,
in determining the availability of alimony, the economic approach eschews
what it describes as "a simple comparison of one spouse's income to the
other's" and instead compares a particular spouse's position at the time of
2
divorce "to an alternative (if hypothetical) outcomefor that same spouse.""
In essence, then, the economic approach attempts to erase the effects of
marriage for a single spouse by placing that spouse in the position she

111. Brinig & Carbone, supra note 9, at 898.
112. ElIman, supra note 25, at 272.
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would have been in had the marriage not occurred.' 13
Even if such an approach were feasible as a practical matter, it seems
oddly inappropriate in the context of marriage and divorce. What distinguishes marriage from most other transactions-even long-term, relational
ones-is that it entails a commitment to tie one's personal and economic
destiny to the destiny of another person. Although divorce may undo that
commitment and thereby end the joint journey, it seems futile to attempt
to reorder the world as if the journey never occurred.
Perhaps another way of making this point is to suggest that what is
distinctive about marriage, even in the age of no-fault divorce, is the
commitment that spouses make to each other (and to society) to attend to
each other's relative well-being. As Deborah Rhode and Martha Minow
put it, "marriage has presented a promise-between the members of the
couple and also between the couple and society-that the costs of traditional gender roles will not be borne by women alone but will be spread
more broadly throughout society." 1' 14 To ignore such a commitment to
relative well-being, as the economic justification for alimony appears to do,
is to deny the distinctiveness of marriage.
4. The Link Between Premarital and Postmarital Behavior
Applying the efficiency rationale for alimony to the real world of divorce
depends centrally on the ability to compare and distinguish a wife's earning capacity at the time of divorce with the lifetime earning capacity that
she could have expected had the marriage not occurred.' 1 5 Adherents of
the efficiency theory admit that these calculations may be difficult, but
suggest that the law deals with similar problems of speculation and of
estimating future earnings in a variety of other contexts." 6 This response,
however, underestimates both the practical and the theoretical difficulties
associated with the counter-factual earnings comparison demanded by the
economic approach.
It is true that current law requires courts to estimate long-term earning
capacity in contexts such as wrongful death and personal injury litigation.
Both courts and litigants, however, find these calculations difficult and
expensive, particularly where a claimant lacks a consistent earning record

113. This approach is analogous to a reliance measure of damages for breach of contract.
114. Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the
Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS,
supra note 14, at 191, 194.
115. See Ellman, supra note 2, at 78 ("The most important determination under this
theory is the difference between the earning capacity the claimant would have achieved if
she had invested her time in marketable skills, and her actual earning capacity upon
divorce.").
116. See id. at 78-79 (discussing speculation in determining contract damages).
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at the time the injury or death occurs. But even these difficult cases do not
require courts to engage in the sort of counter-factual speculation necessary to determine what a particular divorcing spouse's lifetime earnings
would have been had her life taken a fundamentally different turn some
ten, fifteen, or even thirty years ago. Consider, for example, an eighteenyear-old who marries immediately after high school and who engages in
minimal paid employment over the course of a thirty-year marriage. Had
this woman never married, and instead invested her energies in the market, would she have obtained a college or even a graduate school degree,
11 7
pursued a decent-paying trade, or worked at a series of low wage jobs?
And what of the young woman who, because of marriage, forgos the
118 Had she pursued
possibility of a demanding athletic or artistic career.
her marketable talents, rather than her nurturing and homemaking skills,
would she have been a successful entertainer-or even a superstar--or
would she have gotten no further than second string?
The speculation necessary to answer these "what if" questions dwarfs
the guess work entailed in estimating the value of a professional degree
earned during marriage, and courts have repeatedly characterized the
latter enterprise as far too speculative and uncertain to form the basis for a
marital property award.119 Moreover, reliance on average earning statistics-generally the most useful tool for estimating future earning capacity-is particularly problematic for the economic justification, because
average earning figures for women themselves reflect the depressing effects of marriage and child-related responsibilities, and it is precisely these
marriage-related effects on earnings that the economic approach wishes to
control for.
An alimony inquiry that focuses on determining what would have happened but for the marriage is also likely to engender a particularly unsavory type of divorce dialogue. It encourages the primary wage-earner to

117. At least one commentator has proposed dealing with an analogous situation by
valuing such a homemaker's household services "based on the mean earnings of an average

high school graduate, an average college graduate and a college graduate with 1-3 years of
post-graduate work." Thomas R. Ireland, Valuing HomemakerProduction by Implied Opportunity Cost: Using a Family Human Capital Methodology, 1 J. LEGAL ECON. 1, 8 (1991). Ireland

concedes, however, that it is not possible to know which of these alternative career tracks is
the correct one. Id.
118. Cf. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND THE

LAW 295-99 (1983) (discussing a marriage contract between a medical student and an
aspiring dancer).
119. See, e.g., Moss v. Moss, 639 S.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) ("In addition to
and often used interchangeably with the degree and the license, there is the actual 'practice'
The only
itself ... [that] may or may not materialize into some definite status or value ....

absolute in this consideration is the cost of the degree itself." ); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453

A.2d 527, 532 (N.J. 1982) ("Valuing a professional degree in the hands of any particular
individual at the start of his or her career would involve a gamut of calculations that reduces

to little more than guesswork.").
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argue that "if she hadn't married me, she never would have amounted to
anything," and the domestic specialist to counter that "but for our ill-fated
and ill-advised union, I would have been a financial star." Moreover, the
disparate estimates of lost earning capacity produced by these warring
perspectives, combined with the general uncertainty inherent in estimating
future earnings, are likely to inhibit the predictability of alimony awards
and thereby undermine the effectiveness of the economic approach as an
ex ante incentive device.
These enormous practical difficulties point to a larger, theoretical problem in the economic approach's attempt to calculate the earnings loss
attributable to a particular marriage. The approach assumes that it is
possible to apportion economic inequality into that which results from a
particular marriage and that which exists independent of the marriage. But
this ignores the close connection-particularly for women-between the
gendered division of household labor and the premarital decisions that
individuals make in anticipation of becoming spouses and parents. The
economists' attempt to distinguish empirically between marital and nonmarital losses thus fails to acknowledge that determining whether something is
"attributable to" a marriage is not fundamentally an empirical question,
but rather a moral or policy judgment.1 2 ° It is particularly ironic that
efficiency theorists deploy precisely this insight in discussing human capital
gains (i.e., insisting that a professional degree acquired during marriage
should not generally be viewed as attributable to the marriage) while
rigidly confining the losses that alimony may address to those that can be
both temporally and causally linked to changes of position during marriage.
D. MARRIAGE AS A CASE OF MARKET FAILURE

Finally, the economic approach to alimony may fail, even on its own
terms. Economic efficiency analysis, at least in its simplest form, assumes a
reasonably functioning market in which participants have access to information and respond rationally to that information. But recent empirical
evidence suggests that decisions about marriage and divorce-if they can
be described in market terms at all-are most accurately described as a
case of extreme market failure.
Consider the recent empirical study undertaken by Professors Lynn
Baker and Robert Emery. 121 Baker and Emery surveyed marriage license
applicants and law students about their knowledge of the demographics of
divorce, the content of divorce statutes, and expectations for their own
marriages. The authors found that, while both groups of respondents had
120. In this sense, it may be analogized to the notion of probable cause.

121. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439

(1993).
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relatively accurate perceptions of the likelihood and the effects of divorce
in the population as a whole, these same individuals had thoroughly
idealistic (and statistically unrealistic) expectations about both the longevity of their own marriages and the consequences of divorce for them
personally. For example, when license applicants were asked to estimate
the percentage of American couples marrying today who will eventually
get divorced, their median response was a statistically accurate fifty percent. 2 2 When these same license applicants were asked to estimate the
likelihood that they personally would divorce, however, the median response was zero.12 3
Similarly, the applicants' predictions of the consequences of divorce for
them personally were far more optimistic than their perceptions of the
effects of divorce on others. For example, the median female respondent
estimated (very optimistically) that forty percent of divorcing women are
awarded alimony. 24 But a whopping eighty-one percent of female respondents expected that the court would award them alimony if they requested
it at divorce. 2 5 Male responses showed a similar discrepancy. Although
the median male respondent estimated (even more unrealistically) that
fifty percent of all divorcing women are awarded alimony, eighty-three
percent of the male respondents expected that a divorce court would
126
award alimony to their wives if she requested it.
The greatest discrepancy between the respondents' expectations for
themselves and for others concerned the likelihood that a divorced spouse
would comply fully with the court's financial orders. For example, the
median respondent estimated that forty percent of all spouses who are
127 However, one hundred
awarded alimony actually receive full payment.
percent of the respondents who expected to be awarded alimony in the
event of divorce predicted that their spouse would comply fully with the
court's award. 12 8 Similarly, although the median respondent reported (quite
accurately) that only forty percent of all parents who are awarded child
applicants
support receive all payments, ninety-eight percent of the license
129
compliant.
fully
be
would
ex-spouse
own
predicted that their
The law students surveyed by Baker and Emery exhibited similar discrepancies in response patterns, both before and after completing a course in
family law.13 ° Moreover, although the students' exposure to family law signifi122. Id. at 442.
123. Id. at 443.
124. Id.
125. Id.

126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

130. Id. at 445.
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cantly improved the accuracy of their perceptions regarding the content of
divorce statutes, it had no statistically significant effect on the students'
idealistic expectations regarding either the longevity of their own marriages or the likely financial consequences should they personally experience divorce.
What do these results tell us? I think they tell us, among other things,
that prospective spouses do not approach marriage as they would approach a market transaction. They do not view themselves as rational,
self-interested maximizers, nor do they expect such behavior on the part of
their partners. Instead, they continue to see marriage-or at least their
own marriages-as serving a more robust set of values and as governed, at
least in part, by norms of distributive justice. By ignoring the effect of
marriage on relative well-being, and by positing efficiency as its primary
goal, the dominant economic justification for alimony denies the distinctiveness of marriage in a way that is likely to disserve the interests of the
women who continue to invest disproportionately in it.
V. TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE JUSTIFICATION FOR ALIMONY
The economic justification for alimony is correct in assuming that, to
make sense of alimony, one must make sense of marriage.1 3 1 But the vision
of marriage offered by economic efficiency theory is not one that feminists
are likely to embrace. Nor should they. The theory's commitment to
specialization, its dismissal of marital gain, and its inattention to relative
spousal well-being add up to a vision that seems designed to reinforce
traditional marital roles, but then to require divorcing women to absorb a
disproportionate share of the costs of such roles, while granting their
primary wage-earner husbands a disproportionate share of the benefits.
An important task for feminists and others dissatisfied with this vision is
to offer an alternative vision of marriage and its dissolution that incorporates the insights of economic analysis, but that avoids these gendered
costs and benefits. Several of the articles in this symposium-and the
spirited discussion that accompanied their presentation-represent important contributions toward that end.13 2 What follows is a brief, and necessarily tentative, discussion of one proposed alternative to the economic
justification for alimony.

131. Carbone & Brinig, supra note 73, at 954.

132. Martha Albertson Fineman, Comments on Twila Perry's Paper, 82 GEO. L.J. 2521
(1994) (reviewing Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the Search for
Theory, 82 GEO. L.J. 2481 (1994)); Regan, supra note 13; Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization
of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights To Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127
(1994); Williams, supra note 102.
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A. INCOME SHARING AS AN ALTERNATIVE VISION

My own alternative vision of marriage would combine the equal partnership ideal that underlies current equitable division schemes with the
economist's recognition of enhancements in human capital as the most
valuable asset produced during most marriages. Like their community
property analogues, modern equitable distribution statutes rest on the idea
that marriage is (among other things) an economic partnership to which
both spouses make equally important contributions-regardless of the
133 As equal contributors to the marriage,
form those contributions take.
each spouse should be presumptively entitled to benefit equally from it in
a net economic loss, each spouse
the event of divorce; if divorce produces 134
lOSS.
that
of
portion
equal
an
bear
should
This alternative vision would reject specialization as a goal and would
focus instead on encouraging both spouses to invest substantially in their
marriage. It would do so, in part, by reducing the portability of a primary
wage-earner's investment in market-oriented human capital. By making
such market-oriented investments less portable and more marriagespecific, this alternative vision would reduce the financial appeal of divorce
for those spouses most likely to benefit from it. It would also protect and
promote household investment by giving spouses who invest primarily in
family care a share of the enhanced income stream that their domestic
activities facilitate. Moreover, such an alternative vision of the marital
community would benefit children-both by encouraging child-focused
behavior during marriage and by ensuring children's continued access to
the income of both parents135after divorce regardless of which parent serves
as their primary caretaker.
Describing an alternative vision of marriage and its dissolution at this
level of generality leaves a number of important questions unanswered.
First, how would such an equal partnership model be implemented? I have
previously proposed a regime of post-divorce income-sharing, under which
divorcing spouses would continue to share their joint incomes equally for a
1094
133. See J. Thomas Oldham, Putting Asunder In the 1990's, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1091,

(1992) (book review) ("Underlying the system of equitable division is the conception of
marriage as 'partnership.' Because each 'partner' in the marriage is seen as having facilitated
the other's achievements, fairness requires the partners to share all accumulated wealth if
the marriage ends in divorce."); Sally Burnett Sharp, The PartnershipIdeal: The Development

of EquitableDistributionin North Carolina, 65 N.C. L. REV. 195, 198-201 (1987).

Division!
134. Singer, supra note 5, at 1114-15; Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of Property

Spousal Support: Searchingfor Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L. Q. 253, 256-57 (1989).

31
135. June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community,

Hous. L. REV. 359, 413-15 (1994). Such a child-centered vision of marriage is not meant to
suggest that marriage is the only appropriate place to raise children, nor is it designed to
minimize the need for increased public responsibility for children, particularly for children
whose parents are financially unable to provide for them adequately. See Fineman, supra
note 132; Rhode & Minow, supra note 114, at 204-08 (advocating both increased private and
increased public responsibility for children).
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set number of years after divorce.13 6 Others have advanced similar income
sharing proposals,1 3 7 and the most recent Reporter's Draft of the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution endorses a
form of post-divorce income sharing for marriages of significant dura138
tion.
Although the details of these various income-sharing proposals differ,
the proposals share a common core that sharply distinguishes them from
the compensation for lost opportunities approach favored by economic
efficiency theorists. Income-sharing proposals identify the spouses' postdivorce income as jointly, rather than individually, owned for at least some
period of time following divorce. 139 Such proposals thus represent a significant challenge to the "he who earns it, owns it" maxim that Joan Williams
identifies as significantly responsible for the impoverishment of large numbers of divorcing women and their children. 140
Treating post-divorce income as jointly, rather than individually, owned
is also likely to induce a number of desirable ex ante effects. First, a regime
of post-divorce income sharing is likely to diminish existing power disparities during marriage, by removing a primary wage earner's ability to
threaten his spouse with economic abandonment in the event of divorce.14 1
Second, such an income-sharing requirement is likely to encourage husbands to increase their investment in family care, "since the financial
consequences of such an investment strategy would not be so devastating
in the event of a divorce, and the benefits of investing solely in one's own
career would not be so complete."14' 2 Persuading men to increase their
involvement in domestic life is likely, in turn, to facilitate (rather than
hinder) the sort of changes in workplace structure that feminists and
others have identified as essential to achieving long term gender equity
and to nurturing the next generation.14 3
136. Singer, supra note 5, at 1117-18. I proposed, as a starting point, that the time period
for such equal postdivorce income sharing be set at one year for each two years of marriage.
Id.
137. E.g., OKIN, supra note 104, at 83; Regan, supra note 13, at 2382-2406; Rutherford,
supra note 15, at 577-92; Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse
on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L.

REV. 67 (1993); Williams, supra note 102, at 2258; cf. Sugarman, supra note 14, at 159-62
(endorsing limited degree of income sharing under "gradual merger" and "fair notice"
theories). For an illuminating discussion and critique of the assumptions behind these and
other income sharing proposals, see Carbone, supra note 135, at 372-97.
138. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 3, at § 5.06; see Regan,

supra note 13, at 2333-34 (discussing ALl income sharing proposal).
139. Carbone, supra note 135, at 362.
140. Williams, supra note 102, at 2290.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87 (discussing power differentials during marriage).

142. Singer, supra note 5, at 1121.
143. See generally OKIN, supra note 104; Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989); Nancy E. Dowd, Work
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In addition, an alimony regime based on post-divorce income sharing is
likely to be simpler and easier to implement than a regime based on
14 In particular, income
compensation for lost economic opportunities.
sharing rules will rarely require the sort of complicated speculation, and
associated expert battles, invited by the economic efficiency approach. This
is important from a feminist perspective for at least two reasons. First, it
14 5 Conminimizes the opportunities for the exercise of judicial discretion.
siderable evidence suggests that divorce doctrines that allow for substan146
tial judicial discretion generally operate to women's disadvantage. Second,
by incorporating clear-cut legal standards, an income sharing regime is
more likely than other approaches to hold down the transaction costs
of attorney time.147
associated with divorce, particularly the costs
B. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO INCOME SHARING

Of course, post-divorce-income sharing proposals, and the joint ownership principles that underlie them, are subject to a number of objections as
well. 148 While a full discussion and response to these objections is not
possible here, the following section briefly addresses three potential objections to income sharing.
First, several commentators-including some law and economics theorists-have argued that according lower earning spouses an ownership
interest in their partners' future income gives those spouses too much of
49
an incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior during marriage. These
commentators suggest that, given the availability of no-fault divorce, such
an income-sharing rule may encourage lower earning spouses either to
and Family: Restructuringthe Workplace, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 431 (1990); Joan Williams, Gender

Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559 (1991). For an early

and forceful statement of this position, see Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women:
Labor Market Hostility To Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REV. 55 (1979).
144. Oldham, supra note 133, at 1124; Singer, supra note 5, at 1119-20.
145. Singer, supra note 5, at 1119; see Williams, supra note 102, at 2234.
146. See, e.g., WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 384 (discussing equal versus equitable distribu-

tion of property); id. at 242-43 (discussing the operation of the "best interests" standard for
determining child custody); Jane C. Murphy, Eroding The Myth of Discretionary Justice in
Family Law: The Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 209 (1991); Starnes, supra note
137, at 92-95; Williams, supra note 102, at 2234-35.
147. See Singer, supra note 5, at 1119 (arguing that the lack of precise standards associated with many divorce reform proposals may drive up the costs associated with divorce and
that such cost increases are likely to disproportionately disadvantage women).
148. My own experience underscores the force of these objections. Several years ago, I
mentioned the idea of equal post-divorce income sharing to a group of Maryland judges, as
part of a judicial education program on feminist legal theory. Several of the judges in the
audience literally burst out laughing. At least one judge told me that he viewed my proposal
as "ridiculous" and several others questioned whether I was serious.
149. See, e.g., Borenstein & Courant, supra note 101, at 1004; Cornell, supra note 55, at
123; Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 24, at 557; Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Breaking Up is Hard

to Do: The Economics of Spousal Support 6 (May 19, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Georgetown Law Journal).

HeinOnline -- 82 Geo. L.J. 2456 1993-1994

1994]

ALIMONY AND EFFICIENCY

2457

enter marriage in anticipation of a profitable divorce or to terminate a
union primarily for economic gain.
This argument strikes me as implausible for several reasons. First, the
Baker and Emery data suggest that most people entering marriage do not
consider the economic costs and benefits of divorce.15 ° This is because
most prospective spouses apparently believe-against the odds-that their
own marriages will endure. 1 ' Thus, it is unlikely that a post-divorce
income-sharing rule will significantly influence a prospective spouse's choice
of mate. Moreover, high wage earners who are concerned about exploitation of their current or anticipated earning capacity can protect themselves, prior to marriage, by contracting out of any income sharing regime.152
Such an opt out possibility appropriately places the burden of private
contracting on those individuals who are most likely to take advantage of
it: those who wish to preserve their economic individuality, rather than
those who plan to merge their efforts. Indeed, despite considerable academic writing on the use of premarital contracts as a means of enhancing
marital and divorce obligations, the case law indicates that premarital
contracts are overwhelmingly used by persons who wish to reduce the
economic consequences of marriage.1 53
Income sharing principles are also unlikely to encourage opportunistic
behavior during marriage. First, assuming that spouses have access to each
other's income during marriage, income sharing after divorce is not likely
to improve a lower wage earner's financial position. Indeed, given the
added expense of maintaining two households, divorce is likely to result in
a net decrease in both spouses' financial well-being, even under the most
comprehensive income-sharing regime. Under the current, no-sharing system, by contrast, divorce often improves a primary wage earner's financial
position, while impairing that of his former partner.15 4 Second, a lower
earning spouse who did anticipate profiting from post-divorce income
sharing would have to discount the expected benefits to reflect the difficulties of enforcing divorce-related obligations.155 Third, given the "dominant
150. See supra text accompanying notes 122-3 1.
151. See Margaret F. Brinig, Comment on Jana Singer's Alimony and Efficiency, 82 GEO.
L.J., 2461, 2462 (1994).
152. See Singer, supra note 5, at 1120. Of course, these premarital agreements would have
to meet applicable standards of voluntariness, disclosure, and conscionability. See UNIF.
PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 371, 376 (1983); J.Thomas Oldham, Premarital ContractsAre Now Enforceable, Unless..., 21 Hous. L. REV. 757 (1984).
153. See generally HOMER H.

CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE

UNITED STATES 1, 11-12 (2nd ed. 1988) (discussing antenuptial agreements).
154. See studies cited supra note 14.

155. For a discussion of some of the difficulties of enforcing both alimony and child

support obligations, see WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 160-62, 238-95. For a recent overview
of the problems associated with child support enforcement, see Paula G. Roberts, Child
Support Orders: Problems with Enforcement, in 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 101 (Richard E.
Behrman et al. eds., 1994).
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ecology" of marriage, a lower wage earning spouse is likely to have
invested disproportionately in marriage-specific human capital, particu56
larly where the marriage has produced children.1 This surplus of marriageincentive to engage in
specific investment itself reduces a spouse's
157
marriage.
during
behavior
opportunistic
Concerns about the link between income-sharing and opportunistic
behavior are often coupled with an uneasiness about unilateral, no-fault
divorce. The worst case scenario for income-sharing involves a "guilty" but
yet
lower-earning spouse who unilaterally divorces her "innocent" partner,1 58
I
earnings.
future
partner's
is able to claim a substantial share of that
how
question
I
share the critics' uneasiness about this scenario, although
often it will occur. Nonetheless, if substantial post-divorce income sharing
were the background legal rule, I might be willing to suspend my feminist
"fear of fault" and to create a narrow exception for lower earners who had
engaged in egregious marital behavior, particularly if higher earners who
engaged in similar behavior were subject to a corresponding financial
penalty.' 5 9 Another way of addressing concerns about the confluence of
income-sharing and no-fault would be to restrict the availability of unilateral divorce and to substitute a divorce regime that required either the
parties' mutual consent or a traditional showing of fault on the part of the
party seeking a divorce." 6 While further reflection and research are needed
to assess the full implications of any such re-introduction of fault, I share
"fear of
Barbara Woodhouse's view that we ought not let our feminist
61
implications.'
fault" preclude us from at least considering those
A third issue that income-sharing schemes must address is how to treat
post-divorce changes in the spouses' respective economic positions-most
156. The phrase "dominant ecology" is taken from Joan Williams's symposium paper. See
Williams, supra note 102, at 2236. I am indebted to Peg Brinig for suggesting this point.
157. See generally Cornell, supra note 55, at 112-20.
158. See Carbone & Brinig, supra note 73, at 1003 n.214. Carbone and Brinig sharpen
their critique by reversing traditional gender roles, so that the lower wage earning spouse is
a husband who "drinks heavily, works sporadically, and verbally abuses his wife and children" and the innocent higher wage earner is a beautician who "supports the family and
assumes full responsibility for the house and the children." Id.
159. Cf. Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 24, at 558, 589 (emphasizing the importance of
baseline entitlements).
160. Cf. PARKMAN, supra note 1, at 137-40 (proposing mutual consent requirement for
divorce). As Margaret Brinig has pointed out, a mutual consent requirement is problematic
because it may trap in abusive marriages spouses who lack sufficient financial resources to
purchase their partner's consent to divorce. Brinig, supra note 35, at 468-69. The availability
of a fault-based divorce option, in addition to divorce by mutual consent, helps alleviate this
problem. Indeed, one might argue that several states have adopted precisely this sort of
hybrid divorce system. These are the states, such as Maryland, which have retained faultbased grounds for divorce and which allow nonconsensual divorce only after a substantial
period of separation. See Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 7-103 (1991) (enumerating grounds

for absolute divorce).

161. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a
No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2529-30 (1994).
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notably, changes caused by remarriage. Statistics indicate that most divorced persons eventually remarry.1 62 But these statistics are subject to
several caveats. First, divorced men of all ages remarry at a higher rate
than divorced women. 163 Second, the likelihood that a divorced woman
will remarry drops dramatically as the woman's age at divorce increases;"
divorced mothers are also less likely to remarry than are women who have
not had children. 165 Finally, second and third marriages are even more
likely to end in divorce than are first ones. 166 Despite these caveats, I agree
that income-sharing proposals must respond to what one commentator has

termed "this trend toward 'serial monogamy'

,.167

My response would distinguish two situations. One situation involves
remarriage by the income-sharing recipient. Although some theorists have
argued that a recipient's remarriage should have no effect on divorce
obligations,1 68 1 would take a less absolutist position. Although post-divorce
income sharing represents, in part, a return on investments made during
marriage, it also incorporates the view that the economic effects of marriage generally endure long after the partnership is formally dissolved. A
lower earning spouse who remarries likely enters into a new economic
partnership and, thus, may no longer feel the full effects of investment
decisions made during a first marriage. I would therefore allow an obligor
to request modification of income sharing where his former partner has
remarried. I would not make modification automatic, however, since not
all remarriages have the same effect.16 9 Moreover, any modification of

162. See Oldham, supra note 134, at 1100 & n.45 (citing statistics indicating that approximately 83% of divorcing males and 78% of divorcing females eventually remarry).
163. Id.
164. See Larry Bumpass et al., Changing Patterns of Remarriage, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
747 (1990). The authors note that "age at separation is the most important individual
characteristic with respect to remarriage rates." Id. at 751. Eighty-nine percent of the
women in the survey who were younger than 25 at the time of separation remarried, as did
79% of the women aged 25 to 29 at the time of separation. By contrast, only 59% of women
aged 30 to 39 at the time of separation remarried, and this percentage dropped to 31% for
women aged 40 and over at the time of separation. Id; see also WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at
204 (reporting that women who divorce before age 30 have a 75% chance of remarrying,
while women who divorce at age 40 or older have only a 28% chance of remarriage).
165. Bumpass et al., supra note 164, at 754.
166. See FRANK F.

FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES 14

(1991).
167. Oldham, supra note 133, at 1101.
168. See Starnes, supra note 137, at 138 (arguing that since maintenance, properly understood, represents a return on an investment, remarriage should not trigger modification).
169. But see UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 316(b), 9A U.L.A. 490 (West 1987)
("Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to
pay future maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the
party receiving maintenance.") I recognize that my approach reintroduces an element of
judicial discretion into the income-sharing regime. However, I view the presence of such
discretion less troubling at the modification stage than at the stage of determining the
parties' initial obligations. In part, this is because the party seeking judicial intervention at
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income sharing should trigger a corresponding change in the parents'
relative child support obligations. t T
My proposed income-sharing regime would be considerably less receptive to requests for modification based on the remarriage of an obligor
spouse. A spouse who has incurred financial obligations based on his
participation in an initial marriage should not be able to avoid those
obligations simply by acquiring a new family. To the extent that such
ongoing obligations limit a higher earner's opportunities for remarriage,
this is part of the cost of commitment.1 7 1 As several Symposium authors
have pointed out, women have always known that both marriage and
motherhood impede one's ability simply to wipe the slate clean and start
anew. 17 2 Income sharing merely ensures that both partners live with this
realization. If the ex ante effect of this constraint were to shift financial
and other resources away from the creation of second families, and toward
the preservation or support of first ones, that would not be a bad result.

the modification stage is likely to be the economically stronger party while the party
dependent on judicial remedies at the time of divorce is generally the financially weaker
partner. Couples can also avoid the need to return to court by addressing the effect of
remarriage on divorce obligations in a prenuptial or separation agreement.
170. Singer, supra note 5, at 1120-21.
171. Carbone, supra note 135, at 412. But cf. Oldham, supra note 133, at 1125 (arguing that
divorce law should protect noncustodial fathers' ability to remarry).
172. E.g., Williams, supra note 102, at 2282-83; Fineman, supra note 132, at 2522-23.

HeinOnline -- 82 Geo. L.J. 2460 1993-1994

